

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

November 14, 2018
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OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

TO: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Chief of Police

SUBJECT: HEAD STRIKE FID NO. 005-18

Honorable Members:

The following is my review, analysis, and findings for Head Strike, Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 005-18. A Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) was convened on this matter on October 29, 2018. I have reviewed and adopted the recommendations from the UOFRB for this incident. I hereby submit my findings in accordance with Police Commission policy.

SUMMARY¹

On January 17, 2018, personnel from Gang and Narcotics Division (GND), Fugitive Warrant Section (FWS), including Officers J. Rich, Serial No. 35872 and N. Collura, Serial No. 34059 received information that a male, identified as J. Calderon, had an outstanding warrant for Criminal Threats and Felony Vandalism.

Prior to attempting to locate Calderon, Officer Rich briefed personnel from FWS, providing Calderon's criminal history, description of the vehicle used in the crime and a photograph of Calderon.

According to Officer Rich, during the brief he also communicated information he had received that Calderon *possibly carried a firearm*. Officer Rich discussed *tactics* and designated himself to be responsible for *radio communications* and *all verbal communications* with Calderon (Debriefing Point No. 1).

Note: Officer Collura did not *recall ever being told that* that Calderon may be armed (Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Tactical Communication).

Additionally, Officers Rich and Collura conducted a previous attempt to locate Calderon on January 17, 2018. However, they were unable to locate him.

The summary and the investigation completed by FID for this incident have been provided to the Board of Police Commissioners.

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On January 18, 2018 at approximately 0600 hours, Officers Rich and Collura continued their investigation and identified that Calderon was possibly residing at 453 Harps Street, in the City of San Fernando, with his girlfriend, T. DeAlba.

According to Officer Collura, he contacted his supervisor, Detective R. Rowedder, Serial No. 26915, GND, FWS, by telephone and briefed him on their *leads*. Officer Collura advised Detective Rowedder of their plan, which was to check and see if Calderon was *at his girlfriend's house*. Additionally, Officer Collura inquired if the rest of the FWS team was available, to *start rolling down* to them. Detective Rowedder advised Officer Collura that the rest of the team would *be leaving as soon as they could*.

Note: The investigation revealed that the remaining personnel from FWS were in the City of Palmdale, California on an unrelated investigation.

Detective Rowedder was not substantially involved in the incident and therefore, did not receive findings.

According to Officers Rich and Collura, their plan was to verify if the address on Harps Street existed. If Calderon's vehicle was there, they would set up surveillance and wait for additional resources.

Note: Officers Rich and Collura were in plainclothes, wearing tactical vests marked with Department approved police markings and driving an unmarked grey, sports utility vehicle.

According to Officer Collura, they were *traveling north on Harps Street*, looking for *the white minivan*. As they approached the *target location*, they observed a *brown van with a white roof*, with the driver's door open. Officer Collura observed a male, that he identified as Calderon, standing between the *door and the car*. Believing Calderon had identified them as the *police* due to their wearing of tactical gear, and fearing that Calderon was *going to flee*, Officer Collura told Officer Rich, *let's get out and take him into custody (Debriefing Points No. 1)*.

According to Officer Rich, they *drove on Harps Street*, and observed a *maroon colored van* parked in the *general area* of where the *possible address could be*. Officer Rich noted that the license plate of the vehicle at the location matched the license plate of the vehicle Calderon was known to drive, *but it wasn't the same color*. As they approached, he identified Calderon *standing by the rear of the van*. Officer Collura stopped the vehicle approximately *20 feet* from Calderon. Officer Rich exited as *quick as he could* because he observed Calderon with *his hands in his pocket*. He then attempted to broadcast his *Code-6* location, however was unaware *if it went through (Debriefing Point Nos. 1 and 2)*.

According to Officer Collura, he stopped the vehicle, exited, and approached Calderon, who was standing between the *door and the car*. He observed that the van door partially obstructed his view and believed that Calderon *could arm himself*. Officer Collura, based on his *14 years of experience* dealing with *fugitives* and his knowledge that they *could have weapons and arm themselves*, drew his service pistol (**Debriefing Points No. 3 and Drawing/Exhibiting**).

According to Officer Rich, he gave Calderon *commands* to, “*turn around,*” and “*put his hands on his head,*” to which Calderon complied. Officer Rich then *approached* Calderon and *attempted to grab his hands* and put them *behind his back* while advising Calderon that he had a *warrant for his arrest (Debriefing Point No. 3).*

According to Officer Rich, it was difficult to *pull up* Calderon’s *sleeves* and *manipulate the handcuffs* because Calderon was wearing a *bulky sweatshirt*. Calderon then *took* his hands from the *rear position*, while *flailing his hands and elbows*. Officer Rich attempted to *grab* both arms, but was unable to because Calderon was moving *so quick*. As they moved towards the driveway, Officer Rich positioned himself behind Calderon, held him in a *bear hug*, and advised Calderon to, “*Stop resisting*” (**Non-Lethal Use of Force**).

According to Officer Collura, Calderon *had his hand in his hoodie pocket* as Officer Rich approached. Officer Collura gave Calderon commands to move *away from his door*. Officer Collura commanded Calderon to, “*Get his hand out of his pocket.*” When Calderon *complied*, Officer Collura holstered his service pistol and approached.

According to Officer Collura, when Officer Rich attempted to take Calderon into custody, Calderon began *stiffening up* and *pulling his arms away*. Officer Collura approached, *grabbed* Calderon’s *wrist* and tried to *pull him down to the ground (Non-Lethal Use of Force).*

According to Officer Collura, Calderon then *spun* to the right and began *reaching into the pocket* of his hoodie. Believing he was reaching for *some sort of weapon*, Officer Collura deployed his collapsible baton. Officer Collura ordered Calderon to, “*Stop resisting, get on the ground.*” Officer Collura also ordered Calderon to remove his *hand out of his pocket*. Calderon *pulled his hand out of the pocket*, but was unresponsive to his command to *get on the ground*. Officer Collura then struck Calderon with his collapsible baton two times on the *leg area to get him to the ground (Less-Lethal Use of Force).*

According to Officer Collura, Calderon was *very aggressive, amped up*, and reached *back* into his *hoodie pocket* with his right hand. Believing Calderon was going to produce a weapon, Officer Collura *struck his right hand* two times with his collapsible baton (**Less-Lethal Use of Force**).

According to Officer Rich, Calderon continued *flailing his arms, throwing elbows, and trying to get away* when Officer Collura deployed his collapsible baton and struck Calderon in the *leg area, two to three times*. Calderon then *broke free* from his *bear hug* and ran up the driveway towards a wooden gate.

According to Officer Collura, he believed the baton *wasn’t working* because Calderon continued *fighting, flailing and pulling away*. Officer Collura decided to deploy the TASER, which was holstered on Officer Rich’s left leg. Officer Collura went around to Officer Rich’s *left side*, advising Officer Rich that he *was getting the TASER*. Calderon *broke free* from Officer Rich and ran up the *driveway* towards the house. Officer Collura removed the TASER from

Officer Rich's holster and followed behind Calderon for *three or four steps*. Officer Collura discharged the TASER in probe mode at Calderon's back **(Less-Lethal Use of Force and Debriefing Point No. 4)**.

According to Officer Collura, he observed *one of the darts* strike Calderon in the *back*, but it had no effect. Calderon continued running, *throwing trash cans* and *ripping open* a wooden gate. At the gate, Officer Collura *caught up to* Calderon and activated the TASER, at close contact, on Calderon's *right rib area* **(Less-Lethal Use of Force)**.

According to Officer Rich, as he followed Calderon to the gate, he took an *aggressive stance*, with his *hands and neck clenched up*. Officer Collura then discharged *the TASER* and they *all fell to the ground* **(Debriefing Point No. 4)**.

According to Officer Collura, after deploying the TASER, he *fell on top of* Calderon, *chest to chest*, and lost control of the TASER. Calderon then gained control of the TASER with his right hand and was *coming up to TASE* him. Officer Collura then *yelled, "He's got the TASER"* **(Non-Lethal Use of Force and Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Maintaining Control of Equipment)**.

According to Officer Collura, while *on top of* Calderon, he could *feel* Calderon *brushing* and *hitting on his gun*, as Calderon *drove the TASER towards* Officer Collura's *face*. Officer Collura then *told* Officer Rich, "*He's going for my gun. He's going for my gun.*"

According to Officer Rich, as they fell to the ground, he landed on Calderon's *right side*. Officer Rich then utilized *bodyweight* to control Calderon's legs and verbalized to, "*Put your hands behind your back*" **(Non-Lethal Use of Force)**.

According to Officer Rich, during the *scuffle*, he took his *eyes off* Calderon for approximately *five seconds* to broadcast the *415-man help call*. He utilized a map on his *phone* to obtain the address and then broadcasted his location to Communications Division (CD) **(Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Situational Awareness)**.

According to Officer Collura, he was beginning to feel *winded* and *lose strength*. He believed Calderon was *getting the upper hand on* him, and if *TASED in the face*, Calderon could have *gotten his gun and shot* him. Fearing for his life, Officer Collura struck Calderon *in the head* one time with the collapsible baton instead of *drawing his gun and shooting*. Officer Collura then *threw the baton*, freeing his hand to be used to prevent Calderon from *grabbing his gun* **(Lethal Use of Force and Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Maintaining Control of Equipment)**.

According to Officer Collura, after the head strike, Calderon was *stunned*. He pushed Calderon's right hand, which was holding the TASER, to the ground while also attempting to *keep* Calderon's *hand away from his weapon*. In an attempt to *stun* Calderon *some more*,

Officer Collura *punched him in the face three or four times*. He then used his right arm to *pin Calderon's head down* to the driveway (**Non-Lethal Use of Force and Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Punches to Bony Areas**).

According to Officer Collura, Calderon *bit* Officer Collura's right arm as he was holding his *head down*. Officer Collura believed Calderon was *getting stronger and overpowering* him because he was unable to keep Calderon's *hand down* as he raised *the TASER up to his face*. Officer Collura was then able to *free his arm from Calderon's mouth* and grabbed the TASER with both hands.

According to Officer Collura, while holding the TASER, Calderon *pulled the trigger*. Feeling *stuck* and unable to *move*, Officer Collura told Officer Rich, "*I'm getting TASED.*"

According to Officer Rich, he heard Officer Collura say, "*He's trying to grab my gun,*" and "*He has the TASER.*" He *looked up* and observed Calderon was in possession of the TASER. Fearing for Officer Collura's safety, he drew his service pistol and *pointed it at Calderon's face* (**Drawing/Exhibiting**).

According to Officer Rich, he observed that Calderon was holding the TASER from the side, with a grip around the *whole thing*, and his *finger* was not on the *trigger*. Believing there was no longer a *threat* of Calderon utilizing the TASER, he holstered his service pistol.

According to Officer Rich, he *removed* the TASER from Calderon's hands and *removed* the expended *cartridge*. He then *attempted* a *close contact* TASER activation on Calderon. Officer Rich did not hear the TASER *click* and believed the *thumb switch* was in the *off position*. Officer Rich then *threw* the TASER aside, while maintaining control of Calderon's *legs and upper body* with *bodyweight* (**Less-Lethal Use of Force and Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Maintaining Control of Equipment**).

Note: The investigation revealed that there were a total of four, five second TASER activations during this incident. The investigation was unable to determine where Officer Rich applied the TASER on Calderon's body.

Additional personnel arrived at scene, including Officers R. Medina, Serial No. 38807 and J. Wood, Serial No. 40747, Foothill Patrol Division, and Z. McDurfee, Serial No. 43141, Mission Patrol Division, and personnel from the San Fernando Police Department (SFPD), including Officer W. Dominguez, Serial No. 10146.

According to Officer Dominguez, upon arrival, he observed Officers Rich and Collura *struggling* with Calderon and could *see the panic in their face*. Officer Dominguez then observed Calderon *reaching for an ASP*, so he *kicked Calderon on the stomach to prevent him from grabbing* the collapsible baton. Seeing that the *kicks didn't work*, Officer Dominguez deployed a TASER in probe mode to Calderon's *left butt cheek*. Calderon *continued to fight*, so Officer Dominguez *placed the TASER on Calderon's back* and conducted a second activation.

According to Officer Wood, he entered the back yard and observed *two GND officers on the ground wrestling* with Calderon. Calderon was *hanging onto the undercarriage of a truck* parked near them, *trying to pull himself away from the officers*. Officer Wood held Calderon's *calves with both hands* and used his *knees* to apply *bodyweight* to Calderon's *ankles*. He then *pulled Calderon out* from under the vehicle **(Non-Lethal Use of Force)**.

According to Officer Medina, he entered the yard and observed Calderon *actively resisting the officers*. Calderon was attempting to *roll* under a nearby truck. Officer Medina *grabbed Calderon's waist, near his pockets*, and *pulled him back* from underneath the vehicle **(Non-Lethal Use of Force)**.

According to Officer Dominguez, Calderon was then taken into custody. SFPD personnel *took responsibility of taking care of* Calderon, walked him out to the street, and *sat him on the curb*. While waiting for Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) personnel to arrive, Calderon stood up and *took off running* away from officers. Dominguez *pushed him from behind*, causing him to fall to the ground and *land on his stomach*.

According to Officer McDurfee, Calderon *tried to run*, but an *officer grabbed him and pushed him* to the ground. Officer McDurfee attempted to apply the Hobble Restraint Device (HRD) on Calderon to keep him from running, but was unable because Calderon was *kicking and squirming*. Officer McDurfee then *held* Calderon's legs while *another officer* placed the HRD on him **(Non-Lethal Use of Force)**.

According to Officer Wood, he was given a HRD by Officer McDurfee and placed it above Calderon's *knees*.

Note: The investigation revealed that Officer Wood did not have his HRD on his person **(Addition/Equipment – Required Equipment)**.

Sergeant D. Sanchez, Serial No. 38115, Mission Patrol Division, responded, assumed the role of Incident Commander (IC). Sergeant Sanchez ensured the involved personnel were separated and monitored. He obtained an informal Public Safety Statement (PSS) from Officer Collura **(Command and Control)**.

Note: According to Sergeant Sanchez, because the incident was not an Officer Involved Shooting, he only asked the questions pertinent to the incident.

LAFD personnel responded and transported Calderon to Olive View, University of California Los Angeles Medical Center where he was treated for a two-inch laceration to his upper forehead.

Note: SFPD adjudicated all applications of Less-Lethal and Non-Lethal force used by Officer Dominguez during this incident.

FINDINGS

Tactics – Administrative Disapproval, Officers Rich and Collura. Tactical Debrief, Officers Medina, Wood and McDurfee.

Drawing/Exhibiting – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Rich and Collura.

Non-Lethal Use of Force – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Rich, Collura, Medina, Wood, and McDurfee.

Less-Lethal Use of Force – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Rich and Collura.

Lethal Use of Force – In Policy, No Further Action, Officer Collura.

ANALYSIS²

Detention

The officers located and attempted to apprehend a suspect who was wanted on an outstanding warrant for felony vandalism and criminal threats. The officers' actions were appropriate and within Department policies and procedures.

Tactics

Department policy relative to Tactical Debriefs is: "The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance."

Department policy relative to Administrative Disapproval is: "A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a CUOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training" (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).

The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

Tactical De-Escalation

Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance

² The analysis reflects my recommendations as supported by the preponderance of the evidence established by the investigation.

or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation (Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques).

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

In this case, the officers attempted to arrest a felony warrant suspect who initially complied with their commands. Upon making contact, the suspect resisted. The officers made several attempts to verbally de-escalate the situation and gain compliance. The officers utilized non-lethal and less lethal force in an attempt to bring the situation to a close without resorting to lethal force. Faced with an imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death, the officer utilized lethal force to stop the deadly threat.

During the review of the incident, the following Debriefing Topics were noted:

Debriefing Point No. 1 Tactical Planning (Substantial Deviation – Officers Rich and Collura)

Officers are trained to work together and function as a team. In order to ensure officer safety and help ensure an appropriate outcome, the primary officers and cover officers must effectively communicate with one another. Appropriate communication involves advising the primary officer of any critical occurrences or safety issues (California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training, Learning Domain 22).

Officers must approach every contact with officer safety in mind. Complacency, overconfidence, poor planning, or inappropriate positioning can leave officers vulnerable to attack (California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Learning Domain 21).

Officers Rich and Collura communicated a plan to set up surveillance and request additional resources if they observed Calderon at the location. Upon arrival, the officers observed Calderon at the location, approached, and made contact with him.

Additionally, Officer Rich designated himself contact officer as well as communications officer.

Operational success is based on the ability of the officers to effectively plan and approach each incident in a safe manner. Officers, when faced with an ongoing tactical situation, must remain alert to improve their overall safety, by their ability to recognize an unsafe situation and work collectively to ensure a successful resolution. A sound tactical plan should be implemented to ensure minimal exposure to the officers, while keeping in mind officer safety concerns.

In this case, Officers Rich and Collura discussed they would not take enforcement action if

they believed Calderon was at the location. Instead, their plan was to set up surveillance and request additional resources. I would have preferred the officers set up surveillance on the suspect and request additional resources, as discussed in their original plan.

Additionally, Officer Rich designated himself as the contact officer as well as the communications officer. This limited Officer Rich's ability to complete his responsibilities throughout the incident and placed the officers at a tactical disadvantage.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Rich and Collura's actions were a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 2 Code Six (Substantial Deviation – Officer Rich)

When a unit is conducting a field investigation and no assistance is anticipated, a "Code Six," followed by the location, shall be broadcast. A unit shall not go "Code Six" until it arrives at the scene of a call.

Units on "Code Six" status shall remain available for reassignment to priority calls by monitoring their radio frequencies. A unit on "Code Six" status may indicate to the dispatcher additional circumstances which will make the unit unavailable for assignment to a priority call. These circumstances may include:

- Suspect in custody;*
- Primary unit at a crime scene; and/or,*
- Required at a back-up, assistance, or help location.*

***Note:** The unit shall notify the dispatcher as soon as it is again available for radio calls (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 4, Section 120.40).*

Officer Rich did not advise CD of their Code-6 location.

The purpose of broadcasting a Code-6 location is to advise CD and officers in the area of their location and the nature of the field investigation, should the incident escalate and necessitate the response of additional personnel.

In this situation, Officer Rich stated that he attempted to provide his Code-6 location, however, was unsure if it was acknowledged by CD. Officer Rich should have verified CD received his Code-6 location prior to approaching a possibly armed suspect.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officer Rich, although he believed he broadcasted his location, did not verify that it was received by CD, thus resulting in a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this topic be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 3 Approaching a Possibly Armed Suspect
(Substantial Deviation – Officers Rich and Collura)

There is an equation that saves lives: Distance + Cover = Time. Time gives officers options. Time is an essential element of de-escalation as it allows officer the opportunity to communicate with the suspect, refine tactical plans, and, if necessary, call for additional resources. Entering the suspect's space prematurely may force the suspect to take action, ultimately escalating the situation. Whenever possible, officers should place an object between themselves and the suspect as cover or a barrier. A barrier could be a chain link fence, wrought iron gate, or any similar object that prevents the assailant from reaching the officer (Los Angeles Police Department Training Bulletin, Weapons Other Than Firearms, Volume XLVI, Issue 3, October 2017).

Officers Rich and Collura approached a suspect whom they believed was possibly be armed.

In this case, Officer Rich, had information that Calderon was possibly armed with a handgun and approached Calderon to take him into custody. Although Officer Collura did not recall being briefed that Calderon might be armed, he formed that opinion based on his observations at scene. Despite his belief that Calderon might be armed, Officer Collura exited his vehicle and approached Calderon.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Rich and Collura's decision to approach a suspect they believed was possibly armed, was a substantial deviation, without justification from approved Department tactical training. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 4 Apprehension vs. Containment Mode/Pursuing Possibly Armed Suspect
(Substantial Deviation – Officers Rich and Collura)

***Apprehension versus Containment:** There are two pursuit modes officers may use when a suspect flees on foot, apprehension mode or containment mode. Some factors that will influence an officer's decision to operate in the apprehension or containment mode are the suspect's actions, officer's experience, training, physical fitness level, location and available resources.*

During apprehension mode, officers work as a team, pursue and attempt to overtake a fleeing suspect until apprehending the suspect, making the decision to discontinue the foot pursuit or transition into containment mode. The pursuing officers should assess and communicate with each other before deciding on a course of action.

If the suspect is no longer in sight or enters a structure such as a house, apartment or business, or gains a tactical advantage, officers may make the decision to continue the pursuit in containment mode while coordinating the response of additional units to establish

a perimeter. Containing a suspect in a specific area can decrease the opportunity for an ambush and will make it more likely that the suspect will be taken into custody.

When the decision is made to establish a perimeter, officers should act quickly to prevent the suspect's escape and broadcast the following.

- *General location of an incident command post (the end of pursuit location). This location can be moved later.*
- *Boundaries for the perimeter. Remember it is easier to decrease a perimeter than increase one. Initially, even general locations or instructions will suffice (e.g. 2 blocks to South and North, 2 blocks to East and West of my location).*
- *Request for air unit to assist in establishing or adjusting the perimeter. The presence of the air unit will also encourage the suspect(s) to remain within the perimeter.*
- *Request a supervisor and the necessary resources to safely handle the incident.*

Pursuing Armed Suspects: *When pursuing a suspect believed to be armed, officers should generally do so in containment mode while considering the available tactical advantages, including cover and concealment where available. The goal is to maintain observation of the suspect and the tactical advantage while coordinating the response of additional units and other resources for a perimeter with the objective of containing the suspect and taking him into custody safely. The decision to pursue an armed suspect in apprehension mode may be appropriate when the suspect is at a tactical disadvantage and an arrest can be accomplished with limited risk to officers or innocent parties (Los Angeles Police Department Use of Force-Tactics Directive No. 3.2, Foot Pursuit Concepts, October 2013).*

After the suspect broke free from the officers and ran down the driveway, Officers Rich and Collura engaged in foot pursuit after him, despite believing he was possibly armed.

Containment of an armed suspect demands optimal situational awareness. The ability to maintain the tactical advantage rests on the ability of the officers to effectively communicate, thus ensuring a coordinated effort and successful resolution.

Generally, officers are discouraged from pursuing armed suspects on foot. Nonetheless, officers must be afforded a level of discretion regarding the appropriateness of their decision to engage in a foot pursuit of an armed suspect.

In this case, I would have preferred Officers Rich and Collura maintain a position of cover or follow in containment mode while they broadcast Calderon's actions and set up a perimeter.

The UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Rich and Collura's decision to engage in foot pursuit to apprehend a possibly armed suspect was a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this topic be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

Additional Tactical Debrief Topics

Tactical Communication – The investigation revealed that during the initial brief, Officer Rich communicated that Calderon was possibly armed with a firearm, however, Officer Collura does not recall receiving that information. I would have preferred that the officers ensure important communication is effectively relayed in order to provide a greater understanding of the tactical incident. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Maintaining Control of Equipment – The investigation revealed that on multiple occasions, the officers lost or gave up control of their equipment while attempting to control the suspect. The officers are reminded of the importance of securing their equipment to prevent, as in this case, the suspect from gaining access to it. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Situational Awareness – The investigation revealed that during the struggle with the suspect, Officer Rich had to utilize a map on his cellular phone to obtain their location prior to broadcasting the help call. The officers are reminded of the importance of knowing their location and all pertinent information when requesting help. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Punches to Bony Areas – The investigation revealed that Officer Collura punched Calderon in the face with a closed fist, three to four times. Officer Collura is reminded that punches to bony areas can cause injury, thus reducing the officer's effectiveness and limiting their ability to defend themselves. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Command and Control³

Sergeant Sanchez responded and assumed the role of IC. Based on his preliminary investigation, Sergeant Sanchez believed a Non-Categorical Use of Force incident had occurred and proceeded to conduct an investigation. When advised a Categorical Use of Force had occurred, Sergeant Sanchez ensured the involved personnel were separated and monitored and obtained an informal PSS from Officer Collura.

Sergeant R. Leary, Serial No. 37905 Mission Patrol Division, responded and assisted Sergeant Sanchez with the Non-Categorical Use of Force investigation until it was determined to be a Categorical Use of Force incident. He then separated and monitored Officer Rich.

Although it was determined that Sergeants Sanchez and Leary were not substantially involved in this incident and did not receive formal findings, the UOFRB recommended, and I concur, that they would benefit from attending the Tactical Debrief to discuss lessons learned and enhance future performance during similar incidents. Therefore, I will direct Sergeants Sanchez and Leary to attend the Tactical Debrief.

³ Training Bulletin-Command and Control was adopted by the Department in July 2018 after this incident occurred.

Tactical Debrief

In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the UOFRB determined, and I concur that Officers Rich and Collura's actions were a substantial deviation from Department policy and tactical training, thus requiring a finding of Administrative Disapproval.

Additionally, I find Officers Medina, Wood and McDurfee's tactics did not substantially deviate from approved Department tactical training.

Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were identified areas where improvement could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

Therefore, I will direct that Officers Rich, Collura, Medina, Wood and McDurfee attend a Tactical Debrief and the specific identified topics are discussed.

Note: Additionally, the Tactical Debrief shall also include the following mandatory discussion points:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Tactical Planning;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six);
- Tactical De-Escalation;
- Command and Control; and,
- Lethal Force.

General Training Update (GTU)

On February 15, 2018, Officers Rich and Collura attended a GTU. All mandatory topics were covered, including Plain Clothes Tactics.

Drawing/Exhibiting

Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a firearm is: "An officer's decision to draw or exhibit a firearm should be based on the tactical situation and the officer's reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified" (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.80).

According to Officer Collura, he stopped the vehicle, exited, and approached Calderon, who was standing between the door and the car. Officer Collura observed that the van door partially obstructed his view and believed that Calderon could arm himself. Officer Collura drew his service pistol based on his 14 years of experience dealing with fugitives and his knowledge that they could have weapons and arm themselves.

Officer Collura recalled,

And we both walked towards him. Joe was a bit more ahead of me. And due to the fact that this guy was between the doors and I could not see him and, you know, my experience with -- with these fugitives, I mean over 14 years of doing this, you know, they could have weapons and they could arm themselves. So because I couldn't see him I drew and exhibited my weapon.⁴

According to Officer Rich, he heard Officer Collura say, "He's trying to grab my gun," and, "He has the TASER." He looked up and observed Calderon was in possession of the TASER. Fearing for Officer Collura's safety, he drew his service pistol and pointed it at Calderon's face.

Officer Rich recalled,

I -- I was on the radio attempting to put -- putting out the help call. As I was doing so my partner said, "He's going for my gun" and then he has --has the TASER. At that point, I felt it was an immediate defense of life situation so I looked up. I didn't see his hands on the gun at that point but he did have the TASER -- which is a weapon that could be used against us to cause serious bodily injury so I removed my firearm. I pointed it at the suspect's face area hoping he would see that and just release the TASER - -.⁵

Based on the totality of the circumstances, I have determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers Rich and Collura, while faced with similar circumstances, would reasonably believe that there was a substantial risk the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, I find Officers Rich and Collura's Drawing/Exhibiting to be In-Policy, No Further Action.

Non-Lethal Use of Force

It is the policy of this Department that personnel may use only that force which is "objectively reasonable" to:

- *Defend themselves;*
- *Defend others;*
- *Effect an arrest or detention;*
- *Prevent escape; or,*
- *Overcome resistance (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10).*

⁴ Officer Collura, Page 25, lines 5-11.

⁵ Officer Rich, Page 68, lines 20-25 and Page 69, lines 2-5.

Strikes and/or kicks can be used when such force is objectively reasonable to accomplish the following:

- *Overcome active resistance to arrest;*
- *Create distance from a suspect;*
- *Protect self or others from injury;*
- *Stop or stun a suspect; or,*
- *Distract a suspect (Los Angeles Police Department Use of Force – Tactics Directive No. 14, Strikes and Kicks – December 2012).*

Officer Rich – Firm grips, physical force, and bodyweight.

According to Officer Rich, it was difficult to pull up Calderon's sleeves and manipulate the handcuffs because Calderon was wearing a bulky sweatshirt. Calderon flailed his hands and elbows and was able to move his hands from behind his back. Officer Rich attempted to grab both of Calderon's arms, but was unable to because Calderon was moving so quickly. As they moved towards the driveway, Officer Rich positioned himself behind Calderon, held him in a bear hug and advised Calderon to, "Stop resisting."

According to Officer Rich, as they fell to the ground, he landed on Calderon's right side. Officer Rich utilized bodyweight to control Calderon's legs and verbalized, "Put your hands behind your back."

Officer Rich recalled,

He initially complied at the rear of the van. I approached him and attempted -- grabbed the back of his hands, put the -- his hands behind his back and advised him that he had a warrant for his arrest. At that time, I -- he had a very bulky sweatshirt on so it was hard to manipulate the handcuffs with his sweatshirt. I needed to try to pull up the sleeves to his sweatshirt and was having a difficult time doing so. At that time, he began to question us and -- and started to take his hands away from the rear position that I ordered him to -- to be in so I could handcuff him and move him to the front and started flailing -- flailing his hands and elbows all over the place.

So we -- during the scuffle we moved from the back of the brown van back to the driveway where there was a -- a BMV, I believe, a gray BMW. I'm behind his -- he turned -- was turning away from me all over the place, and I was behind his back and on -- on the side of his shoulder just trying to grab him because he was trying to run from the location and flailing his elbows at that time.

He continued to fight and flail his elbows and arms at me. And at that point the suspect broke free from my bear hug.

We -- everybody was tired at that point. Suspect was tired. I could hear the sirens coming from the backup officers and we just let bodyweight on -- on top of the suspect still

attempting to get his hands behind his back but it was difficult to do so. My partner was on his back -- side, back at -- at that point and I was on the suspect's right side trying to control legs and upper body as well.⁶

Officer Collura – Firm grips, physical force, bodyweight and punches.

According to Officer Collura, Calderon began stiffening up and pulling his arms away when Officer Rich attempted to take him into custody. Officer Collura approached, grabbed Calderon's wrist and tried to pull him down to the ground.

According to Officer Collura, after deploying the TASER, he fell on top of Calderon, chest to chest, and lost control of the TASER. Calderon gained control of the TASER with his right hand and was coming up to TASE him. Officer Collura then yelled, "He's got the TASER."

According to Officer Collura, he stunned Calderon with a head strike from his collapsible baton and was able to push Calderon's right hand, which was holding the TASER, to the ground while also attempting to keep Calderon's hand away from his weapon. Officer Collura punched Calderon in the face three or four times in an attempt to stun him further. He then used his right arm to pin Calderon's head down to the driveway.

Officer Collura recalled,

He started stiffening up on Joe (Officer Rich). He didn't let Joe put handcuffs on. And -- Well, rigid and he's pulling -- pulling around his arms. I'm on the left side of him. Joe Rich is to my right. I grabbed his hand, his wrist. And I believe he -- spins

I'm grab -- I don't know which arm or which one I'm grabbing, but I -- I am grabbing his hand trying to pull him down to the ground. I remember Joe lifting him up and I had -- that time I know I had two hands on his arm and I was trying to rip him down. I don't which remember [SIC] arm it was. I could tell that Joe's lifting the guy up and I'm going, okay, we're going to go down to the ground. So I went to pull him down to the ground and this guy gets out of it.

I don't know if the Taser put him down with the contact shot, we tripped on something, but we just went down.

The contact, boom, now we're on the ground. Fall to the ground. I fall on top of him. I'm chest to chest with him, I mean, our faces are -- I'm just -- his face is here and I'm right here. He's got a good grip on it and he's coming up to tase me. And this guy is coming up with this TASER driving it towards my face. So he's -- he's got the TASER in his hands. I'm -- I cup his hand with my left hand.

⁶ Officer Rich, Page 25, lines 6-20, Page 27, lines 11-25, Page 28, lines 15-17 and Page 33, lines 10-22.

It -- it stuns him for a minute, thank God. And he -- he kind of goes back with the -- he -- with his -- with his right arm he lays his right arm back onto the -- the concrete. It kind -- it didn't get limp, but it he didn't have as much strength in it anymore and I was able to push it down to the floor.

So I couldn't get two hands on him to get that -- that TASER away. Because I'm -- I'm rushing -- I'm trying to keep his hand away from my weapon. So I'm -- so I decided let me -- let me go ahead and give him -- let me punch in the face a couple times. Maybe this will stun him some more. Probably three or four times I punched him in the face.

Well, then he goes and he -- and he -- I put my arm, you know, by his face to hold his head down. Well, my right forearm I was trying to like -- like pin his head down to the -- to the driveway.⁷

Officer Wood – Firm grips, physical force, and bodyweight.

According to Officer Wood, he entered the back yard and observed two GND officers on the ground wrestling with Calderon. Calderon was hanging onto the undercarriage of a truck parked near them, trying to pull himself away from the officers. Officer Wood held Calderon's calves with both hands and used his knees to apply bodyweight to Calderon's ankles. He then pulled Calderon out from under the vehicle.

Officer Wood recalled,

At that point, when -- I was able to see two GND officers on the ground wrestling with the suspect, who was under the parked truck. There -- it appeared to me they were attempting to take him into custody. So it appeared the suspect was hanging onto the undercarriage of the truck trying to pulling himself away from officers. At that point, I used body weight on his ankles to lower legs in an attempt to control the suspect, while the other officers attempted to handcuff him. At that point, we're able to gain control of the suspect by pulling him out from under the vehicle. I was holding his -- I was holding his, I would say his calves with both of my hands. And I had my knees on his ankles.⁸

Officer Medina – Firm grips and physical force.

According to Officer Medina, he entered the yard, observed Calderon actively resisting the officers and attempting to roll under a nearby truck. He grabbed Calderon's waist, near his pockets, and pulled him back from underneath the vehicle.

⁷ Officer Collura, Page 28, lines 16-25, Page 29, lines 14-25, Page 64, lines 10-25 and Page 65 lines 1-7, Page 84, lines 22-24, Page 39, lines 2-11, Page 39, lines 20-25 and Page 40, lines 4-18, Page 43, lines 5-25, Page 44, lines 5-25 and Page 45, lines 1-20.

⁸ Officer Wood, Page 6, lines 16-25, Page 7, lines 1-10, and Page 12, line 17-21.

Officer Medina recalled,

Suspect was actively resisting the officers and attempting to roll over under a truck that they were near. I grabbed the suspect's waist, near his pockets and attempted to pull him back out of the --from underneath the vehicle.⁹

Officer McDurfee – Firm grips.

According to Officer McDurfee, Calderon tried to run, but an officer grabbed him and pushed him to the ground. Officer McDurfee attempted to apply the Hobble Restraint Device (HRD) on Calderon to keep him from running, but was unable because Calderon was kicking and squirming. He then held Calderon's legs while another officer placed the HRD on him.

Officer McDurfee recalled,

Again, he was still -- when I tried to grab his legs to hobble him, he was really squirmy. He was trying to kick around. So I couldn't hold his legs and apply the hobble. I had to give the hobble to somebody else and just hold his legs to keep him together.

I held his -- By crossing his legs and held them together. I was holding just below his knees. He was trying to get them loose by like struggling and kicking around.¹⁰

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers Rich, Collura, Medina, Wood and McDurfee, while faced with similar circumstances, would believe this same application of non-lethal force would be reasonable to overcome Calderon's resistance.

Therefore, I find Officers Rich, Collura, Medina, Wood and McDurfee's Non-Lethal Use of Force to be objectively reasonable and In Policy, No Further Action.

Less-Lethal Use of Force

It is the policy of this Department that personnel may use only that force which is "objectively reasonable" to:

- *Defend themselves;*
- *Defend others;*
- *Effect an arrest or detention;*
- *Prevent escape; or,*
- *Overcome resistance (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10).*

⁹ Officer Medina, Page 7, lines 2-8.

¹⁰ Officer McDurfee, Page 10, lines 13-17, Page 16, lines 20-25 and Page 17, lines 1-6.

The TASER may be used on suspects who are violent, or who pose an immediate threat to themselves or others, when an officer believes:

- *Attempts to subdue the suspect with other tactics have been, or will likely be, ineffective in the situation; or*
- *It will be unsafe for officers to approach within contact range of the suspect. Verbal threats of violence by a suspect do not alone justify the use of the TASER. Any threat must be a credible one.*

Verbal threats of violence by a suspect do not alone justify the use of the TASER. Any threat must be a credible one (Los Angeles Police Department Use of Force Tactics Directive No. 4.4, Electronic Control Device TASER –December 2015).

Target Areas for Baton Strikes

When used as an impact device, baton contact should be directed to the areas of the body that will temporarily incapacitate the combatant and avoid contact to the body parts that could be potentially lethal. The primary baton striking or target areas are the bony areas of the body. The secondary striking or target areas are the chest and midsection. While the fluid nature of a violent confrontation may cause some difficulty with regard to effectively striking the recommended areas, officers should still make an effort to avoid striking the head, neck, throat, spine, kidneys, and groin areas to decrease the likelihood of causing serious injury (Los Angeles Police Department Use of Force – Tactics Directive No. 8.1, September 2013).

Officer Collura – Collapsible Baton, Four strikes.

According to Officer Collura, Calderon then spun to the right and began reaching into the pocket of his hoodie. Believing Calderon was reaching for some sort of weapon, Officer Collura deployed his collapsible baton. Officer Collura ordered Calderon to, “Stop resisting, get on the ground” and for Calderon to remove his, “Hand out of his pocket.” Calderon pulled his hand out of the pocket, but was unresponsive to Officer Collura’s command to get on the ground. Officer Collura then struck Calderon two times on the leg area to get him to the ground.

According to Officer Collura, Calderon was very aggressive, amped up, and reached back into his hoodie pocket with his right hand. Believing Calderon was going to produce a weapon, Officer Collura struck his right hand two times with his collapsible baton.

Officer Collura recalled,

And at that point I was -- it was -- it was scary. It was like, what does this guy got in his hoodie pocket? We didn't have a chance to -- we don't know what he's got. I don't know if he had a gun, a knife, you know, some sort of weapon in there. That's what I thought. That's how I felt. So I - - I drew my collapsible baton. And I ordered him stop resisting. Get on the ground, man. Get on the ground.

Okay. And then -- so it was at that point I -- 'cause we couldn't get him down physically with our strength. So I -- I hit him with the collapsible baton in the leg area. I don't recall which leg it was. So I -- I took another shot at his -- at his leg, another strike at his leg. I had a good shot and I hit it, but it didn't do anything. It didn't bring him down.

So now he reaches back into his --his hoodie pocket. And this guy is very aggressive. I mean, he's -- he's amped up. He's -- he's scary. He's to me going to grab something and pull it out of that pocket. That's all I kept thinking.

So I struck his hand in the pocket. I think I struck in the right hand. And he didn't pull it out. So I told, pull your hand out. He didn't pull it. I hit him again.¹¹

Officer Collura – Two TASER activations, one in probe mode from an approximate distance of nine feet and one close contact in drive stun mode.

According to Officer Collura, he believed the baton strikes were not working because Calderon continued fighting, flailing and pulling away. Officer Collura decided to deploy the TASER, which was holstered on Officer Rich's left leg. Officer Collura went around to Officer Rich's left side, advising him that he was getting the TASER. Calderon broke free from Officer Rich and ran up the driveway towards the house. Officer Collura removed the TASER from Officer Rich's holster, followed behind Calderon for three or four steps and discharged the TASER in probe mode at Calderon's back.

According to Officer Collura, he observed one of the darts strike Calderon in the back, but it had no effect. Calderon continued running, throwing trash cans and ripping open a wooden gate. At the gate, Officer Collura caught up to Calderon and activated the TASER, at close contact, on Calderon's right rib area.

Officer Collura recalled,

So, you know, I determined to change from -- from the baton because it wasn't working 'cause Joe (Officer Rich) was in the way and God forbid if I whack Joe. I told Joe, I'm getting a Taser, I'm going to Tase this guy. So I went around to Joe's left side. As I was coming back around to -- to hit him with a contact shot I couldn't give him a warning or anything. It was just happening so quickly. He breaks free from Joe and he starts running into the driveway between the --Towards the house. Between the BMW and the block wall. I come around and I probably take three, four steps and I -- I shoot him with the Taser.

So I'm running after him. And he goes towards the house now this way. There's a wood fence right here in front of the driveway, between the driveway and the -- the backyard. He grabs a hold of -- I thought he was going to hop over. He grabs a hold and just rips

¹¹ Officer Collura, Page 31, lines 20-25 and Page 32, lines 1-15, Page 33, lines 4-18, Page 33, lines 20-24 and Page 34, lines 1-9.

the gate open. That time I caught up to him. I go to do a contact shot with the Taser and in the right rib area.¹²

Officer Rich – One TASER activation at close contact.

According to Officer Rich, he removed the TASER from Calderon's hands and removed the expended cartridge. Officer Rich then attempted a close contact TASER activation on Calderon. Officer Rich did not hear the TASER click and believed the thumb switch was in the off position.

Officer Rich recalled,

So, I noticed that the TASER had a cartridge that was deployed. I removed the cartridge, grabbed the TASER and attempted to give him a close contact shot. During the heat of the moment the -- the thumb switch must have got switched in the -- the off position and as I was trying to administer the TASER it wasn't going off, but in the commotion of everything it just didn't click at the time so I threw it to the side.¹³

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers Rich and Collura, while faced with similar circumstances, would believe this same application of less-lethal force would be reasonable to overcome Calderon's resistance.

Therefore, I find Officer Rich and Collura's Less-Lethal Use of Force to be objectively reasonable and In Policy, No Further Action.

LETHAL USE OF FORCE

Law enforcement officers are authorized to use deadly force to:

- *Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent a crime where the subject's actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others if apprehension is delayed. In this circumstance, officers shall, to the extent practical, avoid using deadly force that might subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10).*

¹² Officer Collura, Page 35, lines 12-25, Page 36, lines 1-19, Page 37, lines 9-25 and Page 38, lines 1-2.

¹³ Officer Rich, Page 33, lines 1-9.

Head Strike with an Impact Device: All intentional head strikes with an impact weapon or device (e.g., baton, flashlight, etc.) and all unintentional (inadvertent or accidental) head strikes that result in serious injury, hospitalization or death.

Note: Serious bodily injury, as defined in California Penal Code section 243(f)(4) includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- *Loss of consciousness;*
- *Concussion;*
- *Bone fracture;*
- *Protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ;*
- *A wound requiring extensive sutures; and,*
- *Serious disfigurement. (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05)*

Officer Collura – Collapsible Baton, one strike.

According to Officer Collura, he was beginning to feel winded and lose strength. He believed Calderon was getting the upper hand on him and that Calderon would be able to obtain Officer Collura's gun and shoot him if Calderon was able to TASE him in the face. Fearing for his life, Officer Collura struck Calderon in the head one time with a collapsible baton instead of drawing his gun and shooting. Officer Collura then threw the baton, freeing his hand to prevent Calderon from grabbing his gun.

Officer Collura recalled,

So he's -- he's got the TASER in his hands. I'm -- I cup his hand with my left hand. I'm on top of him and I could feel -- I could feel the brushing, the hitting on my -- my gun. I could feel that too simultaneously with him having that Taser in his hand and -- and -- and hitting my -- my holster. So, I mean, in my mind now -- now I'm getting pretty winded now. I'm -- I'm feeling like this guy is -- is kind of getting the upper hand on me. I'm starting to -- to lose, you know, some of my strength. And this guy is coming up with this Taser driving it towards my face. Yeah, in my head I'm like, oh, my God, this guy is trying to grab my gun. And I told Joe, "He's going for my gun, Joe. He's going for my gun."

Maybe he would have gotten my gun. So I'm like, in my head, well, do I shoot him? Or do I whack him in the head with my baton and hope that he passes out, goes unconscious on me so we can get these weapon -- the weapon away from him and take him into custody. I decide to -- to strike him in the head with my collapsible baton. And -- so I hit him the head.¹⁴

¹⁴ Officer Collura, Page 40, lines 4-24 and Page 41, lines 12-21.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Collura, would reasonably believe Calderon's actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the Use of Lethal Force would be objectively reasonable.

Therefore, I find Officer Collura's Use of Lethal Force to be In Policy, No Further Action.

Additional/Required Equipment

Required Equipment – The investigation revealed that Officer Wood did not have his HRD on his person at the time of the incident. Officer Wood is reminded to have all his required equipment on his person while performing field patrol duties. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Categorical Use of Force Protocol – The investigation revealed that Sergeant Sanchez learned of the Head Strike approximately 22 minutes after it had occurred. Upon determining a Categorical Use of Force had occurred, Sergeant Sanchez conducted an informal admonishment of Officer Rich, telling him not to discuss the incident. Additionally, Sergeant Sanchez did not deactivate his Body Worn Video (BWV) while obtaining a PSS from Officer Rich. Lastly, the investigation revealed that both Officers Rich and Collura were not properly separated and monitored.

Note: The investigation revealed that Sergeant Sanchez had been a Sergeant for approximately three weeks at the time of the incident and was conducting what he initially believed was his first Non-Categorical Use of Force Investigation.

The investigation further revealed, that while monitoring Calderon in the hospital, Officers McDurfee and Mejia allowed DeAlba to visit Calderon in his hospital room.

These issues were brought to the attention of Captain N. Cortez, Serial No. 30640, Commanding Officer, Mission Patrol Division, and handled through training at the divisional level. The Commanding Officers of Operations-Valley Bureau and the Office of Operations were advised and concurred with the divisional training and documented in the Learning Management System. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Audio/Video Recordings

Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS)/BWV – GND, FWS vehicles were not equipped with DICVS at the time of the incident. Mission and Foothill Patrol Division vehicles were equipped with DICVS at the time of the incident. However, since the incident occurred behind a fenced in yard, the use of force was not captured.

GND, FWS personnel were not equipped with BWV at the time of this incident. Officers Medina and Wood's BWV captured portions of the use of force.

SFPD personnel were not equipped with BWV and their DICVS did not capture the incident.

Respectfully,










MICHEL R. MOORE
Chief of Police

Date: 11-18-18

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD REPORT

INC NO. 005-18	CF NO.	DR. NO. 18-9905942
Law Enforcement Related Injury		

REVIEW BOARD INFORMATION

Location of Incident 453 Harps Street, City of San Fernando	RD 9999	Date of Incident January 18, 2018	Date and Time of Board Review October 29, 2018 1430 Hours
Chair Deputy Chief J. Peters, Serial No. 25750	Signature of Approving Board Members: 		
Member (Office Representative) Deputy Chief S. Malinowski, Serial No. 30959			
Member (Office Representative) Commander J. Rodriguez, Serial No. 25668			
Member (Personnel and Training Bureau) Commander B. Lewis, Serial No. 30272			
Member (Bureau Representative) Commander K. McCarthy, Serial No. 22655			
Member (Bureau Representative) Deputy Chief K. Pitcher, Serial No. 25665			
Peer Member Officer A. Algren, Serial No. 34313			
Presenting Commanding Officer Captain S. Carmona, Serial No. 23605			
NOTES:			
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:			
MODIFICATION TO PRESENT POLICY, PRACTICES OR TRAINING:			
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: flex-start;"> <div style="writing-mode: vertical-rl; transform: rotate(180deg);"> RECEIVED POLICE COMMISSION 2018 NOV 14 PM 1:46 </div> <div style="text-align: center;"> RECEIVED NOV 26 2018 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> COP Date Signed: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> PC Date Submitted: _____ </div> </div>			

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Collura, Nick		Serial No. 34059	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 005-18
Length of Employment 20 years, 1 month		Current Division Gang and Narcotics	Time in Current Division 9 years	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police	Police Commission	
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		
Notes:				
<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed		Notes:		

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Rich, Joseph		Serial No. 35872	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 005-18
Length of Employment 17 years, 2 months		Current Division Gang and Narcotics	Time in Current Division 9 years	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police	Police Commission	
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
Notes:				
<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed		Notes:		

*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Medina, Robert		Serial No. 38807	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 005-18
Length of Employment 7 years, 9 months		Current Division	Time in Current Division 7 years 9, months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes:				
<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed		Notes:		

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Wood, Jacob		Serial No. 40747	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 005-18
Length of Employment 6 years, 9 months		Current Division	Time in Current Division 5 years, 5 months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes:				
<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint		Notes:		
<input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed				

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) McDuffee, Zachary		Serial No. 43141	Rank/Class Police Officer I	Incident No. 005-18
Length of Employment 6 months		Current Division	Time in Current Division 10 months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police	Police Commission	
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes:				
<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint		Notes:		
<input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed				

*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.